The Blueprint: How the Democrats Won Colorado
(and Why Republicans Everywhere Should Care)

"The Blueprint" is devious, diabolical – and successful – and no state is immune. They are coming for the other red states to turn them, too, into festering cesspools of Progressive radicalism.

We urge every person that wants to keep their state rational, conservative or at least moderate – free of socialism and not remove God from every particle of existence, to read the excerpt below of the game plan that ruined Colorado because The Blueprint is hard at work to destroy the place you call home.

About: Since 2004, Colorado has been recognized by both parties as a laboratory for the most sophisticated political organizations in the country. The book is a behind-the-scenes look at the inner workings of these organizations, drawing on interviews with the key personalities involved as well as research and analysis of extensive public records.

In a highly readable and entertaining fashion, the authors dissect the dynamics that led to the transformation of Colorado from a solidly Republican to a solidly Democratic state.

Author Rob Witwer is a political insider, having served in the Colorado State House of Representatives.

Author Adam Schrager covers politics for KUSA-TV, the NBC affiliate in Denver, and has won over a dozen Emmy's for his work.

See inside this book and read its stellar reviews here.

August 14, 2019
Holly Deyo

How I could have lived in Colorado since 1977 for long stretches at a visit and then full-time since 1983 and not know of "The Blueprint"? As I've written before, one of our businesses required that people's drivers license numbers be recorded with their signed contracts. Early on, it became immediately obvious that many people moving here were from California, which was then radically more liberal than Colorado. That was one part of Colorado's decimation. The other component was "The Blueprint".

This book sets out in plain English how The Gang of 4 with precision of intention turned Colorado from a Red to a Blue state. Colorado was the testing ground for their plan and it's coming to the other Red states. One of the Gang of 4 that perpetrated this change is now our governor, Jared Polis. His tactics and policies are so egregious that there is a recall effort underway. As per the Recall Polis website, "Jared Polis is actively destroying Colorado as we know it one bill at a time. Already, we've seen:

  • The National Popular Vote Compact to disenfranchise CO voters
  • Red Flag Bills to disarm law abiding citizens
  • Job-Killing Oil & Gas setbacks
  • Radical Sexual Education overhaul in our schools
  • Attempts to destroy the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights (TABOR)
  • Forced single-payer health care statewide"

Statewide there are over 230 locations where Coloradans can sign petitions to get rid of Polis, now through Sept. 6. To place his recall on the ballot for vote requires 600,000 valid signatures. We didn't vote for Polis and now hundreds of thousands of are experiencing 'buyer's regret.'

The Blueprint isn't about Jared Polis; it's much broader and more diabolical. However, Polis is what you get, along with the two radical-spewing 2020 Democrat presidential candidates, former Governor Hickenlooper and Michael Bennet. Every day we see Colorado turning bluer and bluer. In the early 80s according to the Denver Post, "Colorado was once a reliable Republican win in presidential elections. ..." But as of 2016, for the first time in 20 years, Colorado now has more Dems than Republicans.

"The Blueprint" reveals how Democrats plan to take over every state. It works because it's the game plan 4 multi-millionaire Democrats used in Colorado 15 years ago. Now this state is effectively in ruins, conservatively speaking. "The Blueprint" is devious, diabolical – and successful – and no state is immune. They are coming for the other red states to turn them, too, into festering cesspools of Progressive radicalism.

We urge every person that wants to keep their state rational, conservative or at least moderate – free of socialism and not remove God from every particle of existence, to read the excerpt below of the successful game plan that ruined Colorado because The Blueprint is hard at work to destroy the place you call home.

The Blueprint: How the Democrats Won Colorado

September 28, 2014
Excerpt by Coloradans Adam Schrager and Rob Witwer

The Colorado Education Association is the state’s largest and most powerful teachers union. Sitting across the street from the Capitol, the CEA’s gray, two-story headquarters is a powerful presence for the organization that represents 38,500 public-sector jobs.

The Columbine Room, near the first-floor entrance to the building, is fairly nondescript as conference rooms go — the exposed concrete decor is dated, the carpet drab, the fluorescent lighting pale. But in 2004, (it) became the ultimate smoke-free backroom of Colorado politics.

For the year prior, multimillionaires Jared Polis, Pat Stryker, Tim Gill and Rutt Bridges [The Gang of 4] had been gearing up to get involved in legislative elections. They held parallel conversations, each trying to find the best way to make a difference. In 2003, Al Yates and Stryker reached out to Polis and Bridges. In April 2004, Yates met with (lobbyist Ted) Trimpa for a lunch that established the connection between Stryker and Gill. One month later, Yates and Stryker took Stryker’s private jet to meet with Gill at his Aspen home, where they discussed transforming Colorado politics. Afterward, Yates, Bridges and Polis met in Fort Collins over dinner.

In time, isolated one-on-one conversations became group meetings involving more players with more access to resources.

Everyone wanted to knock out the Republican monopoly at the Capitol. To that end, Bridges, Gill, Polis and Stryker — who would be dubbed the “Gang of Four” by the Colorado press — agreed to pool their resources in pursuit of that objective. By the summer of 2004, they were ready to give money on a level never before seen in Colorado politics.

The first order of business was to find field generals to coordinate the effort. Lynne Mason was the political director and government relations specialist at the CEA. She lobbied lawmakers year in and year out to increase funding for K-12 education. But the Republican legislature never delivered as much as she wanted.

She reached out to friends like Beth Ganz, who was in charge of Colorado’s branch of the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL); Tony Massaro, who ran Colorado Conservation Voters (CCV); Steve Adams, who represented the AFL-CIO; and Jennifer Brandeberry, who represented the Colorado Trial Lawyers Association. Each organization had its own campaign capacities and membership lists, and they knew how to run get-out-the-vote and mail programs in state legislative races.

They all wanted the Democrats to gain seats in the upcoming election.

That summer, the group began to gather for regular weekly meetings in the Columbine Room. Joining them were Trimpa and Yates (who represented Gill and Stryker, respectively); progressive attorney and activist Michael Huttner; Bridges and Polis; state House assistant minority leader Alice Madden; Colorado Senate minority leader Joan Fitz-Gerald; and staff members and field coordinators Brandon Hall, Jill Hanauer, Anne Barkis, Paul Lhevine, and Tyler Chafee.

And so the Roundtable was born.

None of the participants remembers an “ah-ha” moment, no specific meeting where it all came together. When they started communicating, they had no clue what kind of an impact they could have.

“We really didn’t truly know how big this would become,” said Polis. “Clearly, when we started, we had no idea. I didn’t know this would have great historical significance, nor did anybody there, that we would transform Colorado. ‘Let’s get together and maybe we can flip the state Senate,’ that’s what we were thinking.”

Discussion of issues that might divide the group was strictly verboten. “All the participants checked their political agendas at the door,” said Polis later.

“There was never any policy discussed. There were never any issues discussed. This was simply a group of people who believed that all of our issues — and regardless of what they were, what our differences were — would be better represented in a Democratic majority.”

They were all tired of losing. They wanted to win.

The group immediately recognized that campaign finance reform had completely changed the rules of the game. By limiting the amount of money candidates and political parties could raise and spend, the new law had seriously weakened candidates — and all but killed political parties.

“In the past, the party ran this whole apparatus. They called it the ‘coordinated campaign,’ ” said Polis. “The party chairs were largely responsible for the fund-raising. The candidates helped raise money for the parties. It all went into one pot.” After campaign finance reform, that pot shrunk to the size of a teacup.

The vacuum left by the diminishment of the Colorado Democratic Party also created a tremendous opportunity for the Roundtable. Everyone knew the party had been notoriously inefficient when it came to spending its money. To fill the structural void created by the loss of the state Democratic Party, each member of the Roundtable contributed his or her unique tools to the group’s growing toolbox. NARAL and the trial lawyers tapped their donor networks to raise money for Democratic candidates. CEA had access to over a quarter of a million dollars in dues collected from its members, as well as an extensive membership list from which it activated volunteers to turn out the vote on Election Day.

The AFL-CIO took advantage of a loophole in campaign finance law allowing labor unions to raise up to $50 per year from each of their members into “small donor committees” — which were, in turn, allowed to give 10 times more in hard money contributions (i.e., direct donations) to candidates than any other donor.

All of these groups’ organizational capacity had existed before 2004, to one degree or another. But that summer, the Roundtable had four brand-new power tools in its toolbox: Bridges, Gill, Polis and Stryker.

With campaign finance reform, the Gang of Four couldn’t give much money directly to candidates, so they looked to other avenues. And the most obvious were 527s. Named after the section of federal tax law under which they are regulated, 527s were not new, but until campaign finance reform laws were passed in 2002, they rarely played a significant role in elections, especially at the state level. The Roundtable changed that.

In hindsight, it’s remarkable how quickly members of the Roundtable adapted to the new campaign finance reality. While national political groups were beginning to use 527s (the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth is a famous example from the same time frame), in 2004 it was unusual for state-based organizations to understand these exotic organizations and complex rules that governed them, much less master them to the point that they could be used effectively.

The Roundtable capitalized on a key provision of post-campaign finance reform election law — namely, that while nonprofits were no longer allowed to coordinate their activities with candidates or political parties, they were perfectly free to coordinate among themselves.

And coordinate they did.

Members of the Roundtable used four principal 527s: one for the House (Alliance for Colorado’s Families); one for the Senate (Forward Colorado); and two for field operations (Coalition for a Better Colorado and Alliance for a Better Colorado).

The four 527s became the focal point of the Roundtable’s strategic efforts, and they were the principal avenue of participation by Bridges, Gill, Polis and Stryker. One 527 staffer who had been dispatched to Fort Collins to pick up a check from Stryker called her husband to tell him that the check she was holding was big enough to buy a house.

In the end, the donors gave enough to the four 527s to buy a small neighborhood — or maybe just a building the size of the state Capitol. By the conclusion of the election cycle, Stryker had given over $850,000; Gill nearly $775,000; and Polis and Bridges just over $400,000 each.

With such overwhelming resources in hand, it would have been understandable if the Roundtable decided to get involved in races with a higher profile than the state legislature. But rather than spread itself across all of the possible races on the ballot that year, the group decided to narrow its focus to House and Senate campaigns.

In a 2007 interview with The Atlantic, Trimpa dismissed the tendency of big donors to focus on high-profile races as “glamour giving.” He argued that “the temptation is always to swoon for the popular candidate, but a fraction of that money, directed at the right state and local races, could have flipped a few chambers.”

More to the point, the state legislature — invisible as it was to most large donors — was the engine that drove most policy affecting gay rights, the cause closest to the hearts of Gill and Trimpa.

By coordinating their efforts, members of the Roundtable stretched their dollars and eliminated duplicative efforts. Each resource was a separate tool in the toolbox, but everybody was in sync when it came to the overall blueprint. Everyone knew his or her place, and everyone was accountable to the group.

Decisions were driven by data. If data wasn’t available, it was gathered. “We did it very scientifically,” said Polis. “We looked at polling. We looked at messaging. We all looked at the mail pieces that went out. It was a very scrappy, get-it-done-type effort.”

Throughout, the buzzword was accountability.

“People too often measure activity rather than outcome,” Roundtable member Huttner later told Brad Jones, who runs the conservative news organization Face the State. “Anybody, if they have the money, can make 9,000 phone calls and knock on 30,000 doors.” But to the Roundtable, all that mattered was whether those calls and knocks on the doors affected the outcome of the election.

Of the $3.6 million raised by the Roundtable’s 527s, nearly $2.5 million — more than two-thirds — came from those four donors alone. By contrast, in 2004, the Republican House and Senate 527s (there was no separate field organization) raised a combined total of $845,000 — all told, less than Stryker’s individual contribution to the other side.

“We ran it like a business,” Polis said.

Adam Schrager covers politics for KUSA-TV, the NBC affiliate in Denver. Rob Witwer is a former member of the Colorado House of Representatives and practices law in Denver.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Holly Drennan Deyo is the author of four books: bestseller Dare To Prepare (6th ed.), Prudent Places USA (4th ed.), Prophetic Perils: End Time Events Revealed and Garden Gold (2017 ed.) Please visit she and her husband's website: and their FREE Preparedness site:

Other articles by Holly Deyo